Friday, December 19, 2014

Gahima: Inyenyeri News will never apologize for being a voice of everybody

Noble Marara
Editor -in -Chief

Inyenyeri News.

After the recent Article that appeared in the Inyenyeri news under the heading “ Is Gahima haunted by his Role  in the Rwanda Genocide?”   Theogene Rudasingwa a brother to Gahima responded on his facebook page by demanding an apology from inyenyeri news, in his words Rudasingwa stated that.
Theogene Rudasingwa defending his brother Gahima Gerald
”We are yet to reach a stage where we can disagree with civility. Instead of challenging Gahima’s arguments, the Inyenyeri News article said he is a thief. Now, being a thief and having ideas are different things. I say this not because Gahima is my brother, or a colleague leader in the RNC, but because I sense unfairness in the Inyenyeri attack. As for debate on BBC documentary, that is precisely its utility. To encourage debate. That means listening first, even if you do not agree.
Inyenyeri News has simply disgraced itself by parading the usual shameful Kigali-like hatred against Gahima. The honorable thing to do would be to apologise to Gahima, but as it often said, only those morally responsible can rise to that revolutionary challenge”.

Gahima Gerald who questioned untold story credibility

We have received different comments against and in support of the above article. However, the most astonishing behaviour by some people as those telling the Inyenyeri news to apologize for allowing the article to be published. This is like telling the African Chiefs that they should not apologize for allowing slavery of their Citizens a hundred years ago.

In unprecedented demand for accountability by some African civil rights defenders the Traditional African rulers were encouraged to apologize for the role they played in the slave trade.”We cannot continue to blame the white men, as Africans particularly the traditional rulers, are not blameless,” said the Civil Rights Congress.

Could we say that this human rights organization was not civilized because it demanded the accountability of the African Chiefs who helped, aided, assisted, the white man to capture many of their fellow countrymen and take them as slaves?

Should we tell the BBC that allowed this article to appear in its publications on 12, November 2009, to apologize? Who has the monopoly of civilizations when it comes to facts or opinions? The best way of showing civility when it comes to responding to issues in the free speech world forum, is to write and counter argue what you think is incorrect or biased as you might think.

What the Inyenyeri news did was to publish what the writer of the above article thought was a responsibility for the opposition figures to have the moral standing, indeed, to be part of any future constitutional arrangement in Rwanda; there are some historical issues for them to address.

As any prominent public figure, for instance Celebrities, politicians, high-ranking or powerful government officials, and others with power in society will always have a problem in drawing a line between what is personal or private or public.  Why should a public figure that is suspected of theft, become private or vendetta if it comes to accountability? Unless he/she comes with the facts that are contrary to what has been said against him or her. The scales of accountability when it comes to the Rwandan government and the opposition figures should be of the same standard.

As regards, the Inyenyeri news position, we shall never apologize for being fair, impartial, doing our job without fear or favor. Individuals who are considered to be limited-purpose public figures remain so as long as the public has an “independent” interest in the underlying controversy against them.

Unlike all-purpose public figures, it is relatively easy for a limited-purpose public figure to lose his status if the controversy in which he is involved has been largely forgotten. But most will still maintain their status even after they leave the public office. Therefore, those who have been in public eyes remain a target as long as there is reason by anyone to bring to life the old memories.

Related Story:

Gahima haunted by his Role In the Rwanda Genocide?

By  
INYENYERI NEWS    
December 6, 2014

The former Rwandan Prosecutor in the Post Genocide Government of the RPF Dr Gerald Gahima has strongly criticized the Two American Professors who participated in the BBC Documentary that exposed the role of RPF as an institution and Kagame as its leader in Genocide and the shooting the presidential jet of Kagame’s predecessor Juvenal Habyarimana.

The contentious issue in the documentary is the number of Tutsis that are reported by the Two American Researchers and probably according to Gerald Gahima the shooting was not the precursor of genocide.

The question still remains, if the presidential jet was not shot, would the Tutsi have died on the same pace and gravity? The answer to any sounding sober mind will argue that Tutsis had been killed before because they were Tutsis, this means that by definition, of genocide, it was there, but the scale and gravity at which the Tutsis were killed is the contentious issue and whether Kagame or Gahima have failed to convincingly answer.

Indeed, does Dr Gelard Gahima acknowledge that the lighting of the match on the dry season will burn the glass? Or pouring oil on the hot flame, what would you expect? This is what the Professors and other academics are talking about?

Under the International law, Article II of 1948 Convention on Genocide:
 

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy…”

The definition of genocide requires that the perpetrator have a specific state of mind: the “intent to destroy” a group. The intent to destroy is distinct from a perpetrator’s particular motive for the crime, like counter-insurgency. In the absence of explicit evidence, intent can be inferred from facts and circumstances that take into account the general context of the crime, such as: preparation of other culpable acts systematically and exclusively directed against the same group; scale of atrocities committed; weapons employed; the extent of bodily injury; and/or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts.

Does the above Convention talk of any number? Why then many people are embroiled in the number of the people who were killed? For example under the international law, if the number of Hutus which was killed by RPF was greater than the Tutsis but where killed in the war  or as the collateral not targeted  would it  deny the Tutsis Genocide? The answer is no, Dr Gahima as an academic and a lawyer, he should be aware that the genocide definition has gone broader to include even rape, torture, or killing even a single person.

For instance, the tribunals have elaborated on the act of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group.” In the Akayesu case, the ICTR decided that the harm need not be permanent or irremediable and can include torture, be it “bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution.” The judgment in this case allowed rape to be considered an act of genocide when committed with the intent to destroy a protected group. The tribunals further confirmed that the harm also includes sexual violence that falls short of killing.

If then we take the augment of Mr Gahima that the American Professors were wrong on the number of the Tutsis who were killed, but we take the UN Mapping report or Report of other experts on the number of Hutus that have been killed, will it fit the purpose of Gahima’s definition? Why and how should saying that Hutus died be a crime in Rwanda?

This is the same scenario in the Kenyan case were the charges were dropped because the government of Kenya failed to cooperate, should the Kenyan President celebrate? The answer is no, why? 

Because he has not been made innocent by the court, instead the case is shelved, any time he will be recalled to answer those charges, why? Because a crime of international law is not committed by abstract entities but by individuals, and by trying individuals, then justice is served.

Why Gahima wants to wash himself white? The answer is simple; Mr. Gahima had a role in all the mess in Rwanda which he does not want to accept the responsibility like his colleagues, namely Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa, and Dr Théogene Rudasingwa. For instance, the Human Rights Watch in 1994 reported many killings by RPF but were never investigated or prosecuted, this is what it said “Because this report focused on the genocide itself, we collected only limited data on crimes committed by the RPF. The information is sufficient, however, to demonstrate that certain kinds of RPF abuses occurred so often and in such similar ways that they must have been directed by officers at a high level of responsibility. It is likely that these patterns of abuse were known to and tolerated by the highest levels of command of the RPF forces”.

If Gahima does not have the Data of the number of the Tutsis who were killed, does he have the Data for the Hutus?  It’s because of the objective of the RPF and Kagame to capture the State power, he never cared for the many Tutsis who were slaughtered by the Interahamwe and other EX-FARforces, and RPF was busy killing innocent civilians. Mr. Gahima with his colleagues under the orders of Kagame said that they did not need UN Intervention force to either help or protect the Tutsis who were being slaughtered, On April 30, Gerald Gahima and Claude Dusaidi of the RPF political bureau made a statement which declared:

“The time for U.N. intervention is long past. The genocide is almost completed. Most of the potential victims of the regime have either been killed or have since fled”

This was at the time when the Security Council was discussing sending a larger peacekeeping force to Rwanda with a broader mandate to protect civilians, according to many political analysts, the RPF feared that the force might interfere with its goal of military victory.

Mr. Gerlad Gahima therefore is not only counter arguing, but is defending his collective role and ugly past in the Genocide against the Tutsis and his abuse of power after the genocide in the Rwanda legal system. For Instance he ordered all the Ministry of Justice (MINIJUST) vehicles to be taken to one of the Garages owned by  Muhamed near Kinamba,  could he tell the Rwandan people and clear on this matter? Again, the fall of BAKAR Bank and the subsequent fleeing of its Managing Director, Mr Valence Kajeguhakwa, was the work of Mr. Gahima Gerald.

Similarly, the storey magnificent building, adjacent to his former office as the prosecutor general, how did he own it?  The loans from many Banks were he even assigned his mother an old woman for more than 70 FRW Million, was unearthed by the Rwanda authorities. The abuse of power extended to the judiciary, he once went to the High Court single handedly with cuffs   arresting judges, and many flying through windows.

Why can’t Mr. Gahima be realistic, if the figures are wrong, and lets us assume that they are wrong why, can’t the Rwandan government come up with the real figures? Or with immediate effect create a commission of Inquiry as it had done, on the BBC, or Habyarimana Shooting, or the French Role in the Rwandan Genocide respectively?

Where would the American Professors get the accuracy that Mr. Gahima wants us to believe if they are now blocked to go back to Rwanda and are now Persona no grata in Rwanda?  The Dr Alison Des Forges he is referring to, was also made Persona no grata before she died, why? He is telling people to read his book? Is he an authority on genocide of Rwanda, in which he has an interest? As a lawyer, he knows the maxim of not being a judge in your own cause, indeed, that’s why we have never had an independent inquiry in the death of two heads of state in the political and legal history of the international community.

Therefore, Mr. Gahima should tell the Rwandans his role in the Genocide against the Tutsis and the reckless massacre of many Hutus, he has a responsibility in all the mess of the Rwanda politics since RPF took power, it is his confession and ability to make himself a new man that many Rwandans want, not his rhetoric that he is a saint and Kagame is the devil.

Related Story:
UBUSHAKASHATSI BWAKOZWE NA PROF. ALLAN STAN &CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT KURI GENOCIDE by Radio Itahuka
 

Congo: How to Dismantle a Deadly Militia / Comment Démanteler une Milice Meurtrière

Facing a deadline from the UN Security Council and regional African governments to fully demobilize or face military operations by January 2, 2015, the rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo known as the FDLR  is currently regrouping, mobilizing political support, and continuing to pose a regional security threat. Based on 6 months of field research, this report outlines seven policy steps for policymakers to take to help end the FDLR.
Devant l’échéance imposée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et les gouvernement africains de la région pour se démobiliser complètement d’ici le 2 janvier 2015, sous peine de faire face à des actions militaires, le groupe rebelle connu sous le nome des FDLR  en République Démocratique du Congo, est actuellement en train de se regrouper, de mobiliser un soutien politique et constitue toujours une menace pour la sécurité de la région. Basé sur 6 mois de recherche en profondeur, ce rapport présente sept étapes pour les décideurs politiques à prendre pour mettre fin à la FDLR.
 
 
 

How to Dismantle a Deadly Militia: Seven Non-Military Tactics to Help End the FDLR Threat in Congo

Executive Summary and Recommendations

Facing a deadline from the UN Security Council and regional African governments to fully demobilize or face military operations by January 2, 2015, the rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo known as the FDLR  is currently regrouping, mobilizing political support, and continuing to pose a regional security threat. The FDLR is one of the most significant and abusive armed groups in Congo and Rwanda, several of its leaders were involved in helping to perpetrate the Rwandan genocide, and it has committed repeated massacres against civilians in Congo.

Combatting the FDLR has become the stated raison d’être for several active Congolese armed groups.  An important reason to focus on the FDLR is that Rwanda has repeatedly cited the FDLR threat as a justification to intervene in eastern Congo. Ending the FDLR would counter that justification and eliminate one of the major drivers of instability in eastern Congo and the region.

Evidence from U.N. experts and findings from six months of Enough Project field research in Congo suggest that the FDLR’s current strategy is focused on reorganizing itself in three main areas: generating more income to trade for ammunition and weapons, mobilizing political support in an attempt to gain greater legitimacy, and preparing to avoid military defeat through alliance-building and recruitment. Despite the group’s rhetoric that its fighters are in the process of disarming, the FDLR has failed to meet several deadlines to demobilize set by regional governments and the international community. Fewer than 200 rank-and-file soldiers have laid down their weapons to date, and the group has refused to relocate to designated demobilization camps.

The FDLR continues to generate revenue mainly by trading gold through North Kivu and Uganda and by illegally producing and trading charcoal from Virunga National Park, a trade worth an estimated $32 million per year.  The group is using part of that revenue to purchase ammunition and arms from Congolese army officers, with whom it continues to collaborate and share intelligence. The U.N. Group of Experts and interviewees around Virunga Park also note that the FDLR continues to recruit foot soldiers.  The FDLR has also struck military alliances with Congolese armed groups, including Maï-Maï Lafontaine and others. Finally, the FDLR is gathering political momentum by having created new alliances with four Rwandan political parties that are frustrated with the increasing lack of political space in Rwanda. Anecdotal evidence from Enough Project field interviews shows that these alliances are boosting morale within the FDLR, though some of the enthusiasm has dissipated recently in the wake of strong disarmament messages from regional governments and the international community.

The FDLR’s current strategy is consistent with its longtime pattern of responding to military pressure. In this pattern, the group promises to disarm and reiterates its political aspirations for recognition as a Rwandan opposition group.  The FDLR then uses any reprieve to regroup by building military alliances and increasing economic activity and recruitment.

Since the defeat of the M23 rebel group in November 2013, the FDLR has received significant attention in both the region and the broader international community as the next main armed group to address. This attention, however, has translated into very little policy action to date, and the rebels’ promises to disarm have gone largely unfulfilled. Efforts to end the FDLR have suffered from a lack of consensus to undertake military operations or other non-military steps in part because of the group’s position at the center of regional tensions. The Congolese government, which would have to play a critical role in efforts to counter the FDLR, hesitates in part because its ties to the FDLR are economically and politically beneficial. Several Congolese army officers, for example, continue to benefit from the FDLR’s illegal gold and charcoal trade. South Africa and Tanzania, the chief troop-contributing countries to the U.N. Intervention Brigade in the Congo, have supported Kinshasa to date in large part due to business interests related to the Inga III mega-dam and because of strained relations with Rwanda. South African and Tanzanian leaders have also bristled at Rwanda’s alleged attempted assassinations of political opponents in South Africa. The current chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Angola, has attempted to push the region to act more forcefully on the FDLR, preferring military force but stopping short of contributing troops to the U.N. brigade.

A significant issue with the military option is that the FDLR embeds itself in local communities and refugee populations, creating a legitimate risk that counter-FDLR operations will cause civilian casualties on a scale that is similar to past operations that used conventional military strategies. The risk of civilian casualties can be mitigated if operations using special forces target the FDLR leadership and also incorporate strong civilian protection measures. Lessons from the African Union’s mission to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) should be applied.

Defeating the FDLR will require a comprehensive strategy that incorporates both targeted military approaches and more concerted diplomatic action on non-military areas, including high-level diplomacy, economic measures, incentives to increase defections, humanitarian steps, and criminal accountability.

In particular, the FDLR’s collaboration with the Congolese army and its economic lifelines must be significantly curtailed. This report sets out key non-military approaches to ending the FDLR’s ability to continue to threaten peace and security in the region. A follow-up report will review military steps necessary to address the FDLR.

Recommendations
  1. Regional diplomacy. U.N. Special Envoy Said Djinnit should continue to proactively repair relations between Rwanda and South Africa as well as relations between Rwanda and Tanzania. The aim should be to forge regional consensus for both targeted military operations and urgently-needed non-military measures to neutralize the FDLR. In addition to shuttle diplomacy and bringing key officials together for talks, initiatives could include confidence-building measures, such as facilitating increased economic ties among the countries, issuing common statements on the FDLR, and/or possible diplomatic retreats, such as a new round of the Oyo Process in Congo-Brazzaville.
  2. Cutting off the FDLR’s economic lifelines: charcoal. U.N. Special Envoy Said Djinnit, U.S. Special Envoy Russ Feingold, and U.N. Special Representative Martin Kobler should press the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) and the Congolese police to support the Virunga park rangers of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) in interdicting the FDLR’s supply routes for charcoal from Virunga National Park to Goma. The envoys should also press MONUSCO to provide peacekeepers to patrol the park with the Virunga park rangers to help curtail charcoal production in the park.
  3. Accountability for Congolese army officers. Djinnit, Feingold, Kobler, and Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos should escalate pressure on the Congolese government to investigate, suspend, and indict Congolese military officers who are suspected of collaborating with the FDLR. The issue should be placed on the agendas of the ICGLR high-level talks and the U.N. Security Council. Such collaboration is a major issue, because it enables the rebels to avoid attacks and resupply. Despite several years of such collaboration documented by U.N. experts, no Congolese army officer has ever been suspended for collaboration with the FDLR.
  4. Work to apprehend FDLR leader Sylvestre Mudacumura and encourage public indictments. Djinnit, Feingold, and dos Santos should urge MONUSCO and the Congolese government to cooperate with the International Criminal Court, apprehend Mudacumura, and strengthen the case against him. Work on this area can help both break down the structures of impunity that allow FDLR’s leadership to thrive and also restore dignity and security to victims. The envoys should also encourage regional governments to develop investigations and public indictments against FDLR, M23, and other high-level persons accused of committing grave atrocity crimes. Public indictments will help encourage non-indicted FDLR and other armed combatants to defect without fear of apprehension.
  5. Third-country resettlement. Djinnit, European Union Representative Koen Vervaeke, and Feingold should finalize negotiations with countries outside the Great Lakes region and develop concrete options for resettlement for FDLR combatants who are not indicted for atrocity crimes and who have a fear of return to Rwanda. Such offers should include the protective measures necessary to encourage increased defection.
  6. Refugees. Djinnit, Feingold, and Kobler should work with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to set up protected camps for refugees in eastern Congo. The envoys should also ensure that MONUSCO provides security for the camps. The current internal displacement camps where Rwandan refugees stay serve as recruitment pools for the FDLR. The creation of U.N. refugee camps with much stronger security and protection provided by MONUSCO would help counter FDLR recruitment from these camps.
  7. Security guarantees. Djinnit, Feingold, and dos Santos should work with Rwanda to provide an improved security plan that is co-signed by international actors and to issue a new statement that would outline more concrete plans for security and non-prosecution guarantees for FDLR combatants not indicted for grave crimes. Rwanda has had a policy to date, but security deals that have been reportedly broken have made FDLR fighters not trust the current arrangements. A new revised program, co-signed by the United Nations and/or the Southern African Development Community (SADC), could help spur more defections from the FDLR.

Read the full report here (PDF)

Comment Démanteler une Milice Meurtrière: Sept Stratégies Non-Militaires pour Aider à Mettre Fin à la Menace des FDLR au Congo

Résumé exécutif et recommandations

Devant l’échéance imposée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et les gouvernement africains de la région pour se démobiliser complètement d’ici le 2 janvier 2015, sous peine de faire face à des actions militaires, le groupe rebelle connu sous le nome des FDLR  en République Démocratique du Congo, est actuellement en train de se regrouper, de mobiliser un soutien politique et constitue toujours une menace pour la sécurité de la région. Les FDLR représentent l’un des groupes armés les plus importants et brutaux au Congo et au Rwanda, plusieurs de ses dirigeants ont contribué à perpétuer le génocide Rwandais, et à plusieurs reprises le groupe a commis des massacres contre les civils au Congo.

La lutte contre les FDLR est devenue la raison d’être pour certains des groupes armés Congolais en activité.  Le fait que le Rwanda ait cité à plusieurs reprises la menace des FDLR pour justifier une intervention à l’Est du Congo, est une raison substantielle pour les cibler. Mettre un terme aux FDLR contrecarrerait cette justification et éliminerait l’un des facteurs majeurs de l’instabilité à l’Est du Congo et dans la région.

Les données d’experts des Nations Unies et les résultats de 6 mois de recherche sur le terrain par Enough Project au Congo, suggèrent que la stratégie actuelle des FDLR vise à sa réorganisation dans trois domaines: générer plus de revenus pour échanger contre des munitions et des armes, mobiliser un soutien politique afin de tenter d’acquérir davantage de légitimité, et s’organiser afin d’éviter une défaite militaire en créant des alliances et en recrutant. Malgré le discours du groupe selon lequel ses combattants sont engagés dans un processus de désarmement, les FDLR ont manqué de respecter plusieurs échéances de démobilisation établies par les gouvernements régionaux et la communauté internationale. Moins de 200 simples soldats ont déposé leurs armes, et le groupe a refusé de se relocaliser dans les camps de démobilisations désignés.

Les FDLR continuent de générer des revenus principalement en troquant de l’or à travers le Nord-Kivu et l’Uganda ainsi qu’en produisant et en troquant illégalement du charbon de bois du Parc National des Virunga, un commerce estimé d’une valeur de 32 million de dollars l’année.  Le groupe utilise une partie de ces recettes pour se procurer des munitions et des armes auprès d’officiers de l’armée congolaise, avec qui il continue de collaborer et d’échanger des renseignements. Le Groupe d’Experts des Nations Unies et les personnes interrogées aux alentours du Parc des Virunga remarquent également que les FDLR continuent de recruter des soldats d’infanterie.  Les FDLR ont également conclu des alliances militaires avec des groupes armés congolais, comprenant les Maï-Maï Lafontaine et d’autres. Enfin, les FDLR ont accéléré leur élan politique en ayant créé de nouvelles alliances avec quatre partis politiques Rwandais frustrés de manquer de plus en plus d’espace politique au Rwanda. Les anecdotes de personnes interviewées sur le terrain par Enough Project montrent que ces alliances renforcent le moral au sein des FDLR, bien que cet enthousiasme se soit quelque peu dissipé récemment, à la suite de messages fermes pour le désarmement, diffusés par les gouvernements régionaux et la communauté internationale.

La stratégie actuelle des FDLR est cohérente avec le schéma traditionnel qu’elles emploient face à la pression militaire. Selon ce schéma, le groupe promet de se désarmer et réitère ses ambitions politiques d’être reconnu comme un parti d’opposition rwandais.  Les FDLR profitent ensuite de tout sursis occasionné pour se regrouper en créant des alliances militaires et en augmentant l’activité économique et le recrutement.

Depuis la défaite du groupe rebelle M23 en novembre 2013, les FDLR ont reçu beaucoup d’attention, tant dans la région que parmi la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, au titre du prochain groupe armé dont le démantèlement est essentiel. Cette attention, cependant, s’est traduite par très peu d’action politique jusqu’à présent, et les promesses des rebelles de se désarmer sont restées largement inassouvies. Les efforts pour mettre un terme aux FDLR ont souffert d’un manque de consensus pour entreprendre des opérations militaires ou d’autres mesures non-militaires, en partie à cause de la position du groupe au centre de tensions régionales. Le gouvernement congolais, qui devrait avoir à jouer un rôle décisif dans les efforts pour contrecarrer les FDLR, hésite en partie parce que ses liens avec les FDLR lui procurent des avantages économiques et politiques. Par exemple, certains officiers de l’armée congolaise continuent de s’enrichir du trafic illégal d’or et de charbon de bois des FDLR.  L’Afrique du Sud et la Tanzanie, pays qui fournissent le plus de contingents à la Brigade d’intervention de la mission des Nations Unies en RDC, ont soutenu Kinshasa jusqu’ici principalement par intérêts commerciaux liés au le méga-barrage Inga III et à cause de relations tendues avec le Rwanda. Les dirigeants sud-africains et tanzaniens ont également réagi avec hostilité aux allégations faites sur le Rwanda, qui aurait commis des tentatives d’assassinat d’opposants politiques en Afrique du Sud.  Le président actuel de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs, l’Angola, a tenté de pousser la région à agir plus fermement contre les FDLR, préférant la force militaire mais a coupé court à sa contribution de troupes à la Brigade des Nations Unies.

Un problème considérable avec l’option militaire est que les FDLR se mêlent aux communautés locales et aux populations de réfugiés, créant ainsi un risque légitime que des opérations contre les FDLR causent des pertes civiles à une échelle semblable à celles d’opérations antérieures où des stratégies militaires conventionnelles avaient été employées. Le risque de pertes civiles peut être mitigé si les opérations qui emploient des forces spéciales ciblent les dirigeants des FDLR et comportent également des mesures de protection civile solides. Les leçons de la mission de l’Union africaine pour lutter contre l'Armée de résistance du Seigneur (LRA pour Lord's Resistance Army) devraient être appliquées.

Vaincre les FDLR sollicitera une stratégie globale qui comporte tant des approches militaires ciblées qu’une action diplomatique plus concertée dans des domaines non-militaires, y compris une diplomatie à haut-niveau, des mesures économiques, des mesures d’incitation pour accroître les défections, des mesures humanitaires, et la responsabilité pénale.

En particulier, la collaboration des FDLR avec l’armée congolaise et ses sources économiques vitales doivent être réduites considérablement. Ce rapport expose des approches non-militaires essentielles pour que les FDLR ne soient plus en mesure de continuer de menacer la paix et la sécurité dans la région. Un rapport de suivi fera la revue des mesures militaires nécessaires pour répondre aux FDRL.

Recommandations
  1. La diplomatie régionale. Said Djinnit, Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire-général des Nations Unies pour la région des Grands Lacs, devrait continuer de travailler pour rétablir les relations entre le Rwanda et l’Afrique du Sud, ainsi que les relations entre le Rwanda et la Tanzanie. Le but devrait être de forger un consensus régional tant pour des opérations militaires ciblées que pour des mesures non-militaires nécessaires de toute urgence pour neutraliser les FDLR. En plus de guider la diplomatie et de mener les responsables décisifs à négocier, les initiatives pourraient comporter des mesures visant à rétablir la confiance, telles que soutenir la croissance des liens économiques entre ces pays, publier des déclarations communes sur les FDLR, et/ou des séminaires diplomatiques tels qu’un nouveau cycle du Processus d’Oyo au Congo-Brazzaville. 
  2. Couper les vivres économiques des FDLR : le charbon de bois. Said Djinnit Envoyé spécial des Nations Unies pour la région des Grands-Lacs, Russ Feingold Envoyé spécial des États-Unis pour la région des Grands-Lacs, et Martin Kobler Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies pour la République démocratique du Congo, devraient faire pression sur la Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) et la police congolaise pour qu’ils portent soutien aux rangers du parc des Virunga de l’Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN), en interdisant l’utilisation des axes d’approvisionnement en charbon de bois des FDLR entre le Parc National des Virunga et Goma. Les envoyés devraient aussi faire pression sur la MONUSCO pour qu’elle fournisse des casques bleus pour patrouiller avec les rangers du parc des Virunga et contribuer à limiter la production de charbon de bois dans le parc.
  3. La responsabilisation des officiers de l’armée congolaise. Djinnit, Feingold, Kobler et le Président angolais José Eduardo dos Santos, devraient accroître la pression sur le gouvernement congolais pour mettre en examen, suspendre et inculper les officiers de l’armée congolaise qui sont soupçonnés de collaborer avec les FDLR. Ce problème devrait être placé sur l’agenda des négociations de haut-niveau de la CIRGL et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Une telle collaboration représente un problème majeur, parce qu’il permet aux rebelles d'esquiver les attaques et de se ravitailler. Bien que cela fasse plusieurs années qu’une collaboration de cet ordre est été documentée par des experts des Nations Unies, aucun officier de l’armée congolaise n’a jamais été suspendu pour avoir collaboré avec les FDLR.
  4. Œuvrer pour arrêter le chef des FDLSR Sylvestre Mudacumura, et encourager les inculpations publiques. Djinnit, Feingold et dos Santos devraient encourager vivement la MONUSCO et le gouvernement Congolais à coopérer avec la Cour Pénale Internationale, arrêter Mudacumura, et consolider le dossier contre lui. Les efforts dans ce domaine peuvent aider tant à démanteler les structures d’impunité qui permettent aux dirigeants des FDLR de prospérer, qu’à restaurer la dignité et la sécurité des victimes. Les envoyés devraient également encourager les gouvernements régionaux à mettre en place des enquêtes et des inculpations publiques contre les personnes haut-placées des FDLR, M23, et autres, accusées d’avoir commis des crimes d’atrocités graves. Les mises en accusation publiques permettront d’encourager les FDLR et d’autres combattants armés non-inculpés, à déserter sans avoir peur d’être arrêtés.
  5. La réinstallation dans un pays tiers. Djinnit, le Représentant de l’Union Européene, Koen Vervaeke, et Feingold devraient finaliser les négociations avec les pays en dehors de la région des Grands Lacs et développer des options concrètes pour la réinstallation des combattants des FDLR qui ne sont pas inculpés de crimes d’atrocité et qui redoutent de rentrer au Rwanda. De telles propositions devraient comporter les mesures de protection nécessaires pour encourager l’accroissement de la défection.
  6. Les réfugiés. Djinnit, Feingold, et Kobler devraient collaborer avec le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (UNHRC) pour établir des camps protégés pour les réfugiés à l’est du Congo. Les envoyés devraient également garantir que la MONUSCO assure la sécurité des camps. Les camps de personnes déplacées internes actuels où logent les réfugiés Rwandais servent de réserve de recrutement pour les FDLR. La création de camps de réfugiés des Nations Unies qui sont dotés d’un niveau de sécurité beaucoup plus élevé et d’une protection assurée par la MONUSCO, permettrait d’empêcher le recrutement par les FDLR dans ces camps.
  7. Des garanties de sécurité. Djinnit, Feingold, et dos Santos devraient collaborer avec le Rwanda pour fournir un plan de sécurité amélioré qui soit signé conjointement par les acteurs internationaux, et publier une nouvelle déclaration qui détaillerait des plans concrets de garanties de sécurité et de non-poursuite pour les combattants des FDLR qui ne sont pas inculpés de crimes graves. Le Rwanda a jusqu’à présent eu une politique en place, mais les accords de sécurité qui auraient été rompus ont causés la méfiance des combattants des FDLR envers les accords actuels. Un nouveau programme révisé, signé conjointement par les Nations Unies et/ou la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique austral (SADC), pourrait permettre d’entrainer l’augmentation des défections des FDLR.

Lire le rapport complet en français​ (PDF)