FDLR surrender deadline is here but Dar, Pretoria don’t want to know
By Sasha Lezhnev and John Prendergast
Saturday,
December 27 2014
IN SUMMARY
-While the FDLR offered to disarm in May 2014, behind the scenes
it is doing the opposite. Six months of Enough Project field research uncovered
that the rebels are regrouping, trading gold and charcoal for weapons, and
mobilising political support.
-Tanzania and South Africa, the countries that would be the
largest members of the integration force, continue to make excuses for the
FDLR.
-Tanzania lists the FDLR as a freedom fighting organisation
on its government website, and senior South African envoys have lobbied in
negotiations for delays in counter-FDLR operations.
The clock is ticking on a deadline that will help determine the
prospects for future peace and stability in the violence-wracked Democratic
Republic of Congo.
Two years ago, the world embarked on a major experiment in
peacekeeping, sending a robustly mandated force to do the tough parts of peace
enforcement alongside more traditional United Nations blue helmets. The scene
of the test was the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II, in Congo,
where Rwandan-backed rebels had taken over significant swathes of Congolese
territory and threatened to destabilise the entire country.
For over a decade, UN peacekeepers had been present in Congo,
but to little effect. They had failed to prevent numerous massacres of
civilians. And in November 2012, one of eastern Congo’s largest cities, Goma,
fell to rebels known as the M23 despite the presence of 19,000 UN troops in the
region.
Thanks to a public campaign against the M23 and leadership by
the US and UN, the UN Security Council authorised an Intervention Brigade
staffed by South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian soldiers. The force was mandated
to “neutralise armed groups… in a robust, highly mobile, and versatile manner.”
It had initial successes, ably reinforcing the Congolese army’s
push against the M23 with air support and sophisticated weaponry, albeit with
casualties. Thanks in part to these military victories, the M23 officially
disarmed in December 2013.
One year later, the initiative has reversed course. The central
issue today is that troop contributors Tanzania and South Africa are showing no
willingness to militarily dismantle the FDLR rebel group. The FDLR has been one
of the most significant threats to civilians in eastern Congo over the past 20
years, and its presence has served as a justification for Rwandan interventions
in Congo.
It is led by commanders who are reported to have perpetrated
Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and is on the US list of terrorist organisations. The
FDLR has committed numerous massacres in eastern Congo. For example, in
Shabunda in 2012, FDLR combatants allegedly massacred 45 civilians, decapitated
the village chief, and cut a baby from a pregnant woman.
While the FDLR offered to disarm in May 2014, behind the scenes
it is doing the opposite. Six months of Enough Project field research uncovered
that the rebels are regrouping, trading gold and charcoal for weapons, and
mobilising political support.
Georges, a Congolese community leader, told our team, “Their
demobilisation offer is only going to help them buy time as usual.” Congolese
civil society coalitions have written letters to the UN asking it to launch military
strikes against the FDLR.
On January 2, the FDLR faces an ultimatum from the UN to disarm
or face military action, and the international community has agreed on
benchmarks for the disarmament.
However, Tanzania and South Africa, the countries that would be
the largest members of that force, continue to make excuses for the FDLR.
Tanzania lists the FDLR as a freedom fighting organisation on its government
website, and senior South African envoys have lobbied in negotiations for
delays in counter-FDLR operations.
Three changes can get the process back on track. First, Tanzania
and South Africa must commit to conducting operations against the FDLR if the
benchmarks are not met by the deadline. They are helping allow a rebellion to
reorganise that includes alleged genocidaires, that has used rape
systematically as a weapon of war, and that Congolese civil society says
continues to threaten it.
The peacekeepers are under the command of the UN, so operational
decisions should not be made in the capitals of troop contributing countries.
Second, the UN should rotate troops out of the Congo operation
that are not making useful contributions and rotate in more capable militaries,
in co-ordination with the Congolese government. This would be a much more
efficient use of taxpayer money. Angola, for example, has one of the region’s
most capable armies and could be encouraged to take on a larger regional
peacekeeping role.
Third, the US should deploy Special Forces advisors to the
Intervention Brigade in a pared-down version of the successful counter-Lord’s
Resistance Army mission. That mission, with African forces in the lead and
advised by US military advisors on intelligence and defection strategies, has
helped reduce LRA attacks by 92 per cent in three years.
The counter-FDLR operations must be conducted differently from
previous operations, with increased civilian protection and focus on the FDLR
leadership, not simply using a conventional military approach. The Special
Forces advisors can help make those changes.
The initiative to target “spoiler” rebels in Congo with a robust
peacekeeping force was well conceived initially. But if urgent changes are not
made now, an experiment that succeeded at first could easily morph into a
failure, harming the UN’s credibility in the process, with devastating
consequences for the people of eastern Congo.
John Prendergast is founding director of the Enough Project,
where Sasha Lezhnev is the associate director of policy for Congo, the Great
Lakes, and the LRA.
Related Stories:
How to Dismantle a
Deadly Militia: Seven Non-Military Tactics to Help End the FDLR Threat in Congo
Comment Démanteler
une Milice Meurtrière: Sept Stratégies Non-Militaires pour Aider à Mettre Fin à
la Menace des FDLR au Congo
posted by Mamadou Kouyate @ 2:39 PM
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