Rwanda: The Liberation Struggle Belongs to the People

By Michael Mukarage
The New Times-Kigali
July 15, 2009

OPINION

Kigali — President Museveni being decorated by President Kagame during this year's Liberation Day celebrations.

For anyone who thought that efforts by President Yoweri Museveni and the NRM/A leaders to claim ownership of the liberation of Rwanda, ended with his speech at Amahoro Stadium in Kigali, where he chose to re-write and read his own citation to feed into his inflated ego, the article, "Museveni's untold role in RPF war", that appeared in the Observer, Thursday 9 - 12, 2009, clearly demonstrated that the ruling clique in Kampala will go to any extent - including falsification of history - to lay claim to the struggle and success that rightfully belong to the Rwandan people.

That President Museveni did play a role in the liberation of Rwanda is a fact that none other than the Government of Rwanda publicly acknowledged when he was honoured along with Mr. Meles Zenawi, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere for their respective roles in the liberation of Rwanda. However, while the other recipients of the liberation medals and their representatives were magnanimous expressing humility, including Prime Minister Zenawi who in his acceptance speech declared that nobody should deny the fact that the liberation of Rwanda was solely achieved through the struggle of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, led by Paul Kagame; "end of the story", NRA leaders have chosen to re-write the history of Rwanda in a desperate effort to hijack what clearly belongs to the Rwandan people.

It is evident that the article in the Observer is the handiwork of top NRM/A cadres and it is a story based on false claims that shouldn't go unchallenged.

The attempt by the NRA leaders to claim credibility for the success of the liberation of Rwanda can not stand scrutiny. Indeed the military success of the struggle to liberate Rwanda was ensured by the resilience and determination of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), under the strategic leadership of their compatriot commanders led by Paul Kagame.

Contrary to the claim that RPA fighters were rescued by Yoweri Museveni and Salim Saleh, after they were allegedly defeated and fled to Uganda, it is on record that from the day RPA soldiers entered the country on October 1st, 1990, more fighters continued to join the struggle from within Rwanda itself and the wider Diaspora.

The Observer argues that it was not clear how Rwandan soldiers sneaked out of the barracks without the knowledge of orderly sergeants who were on guard, and further quotes the NRA commanders as saying that there is no way Rwandan soldiers could have escaped without the knowledge of these orderly sergeants.

The author and these NRA officers forget that, firstly, the majority of the Rwandan soldiers resided out of the Barracks by the time of departure, and secondly, it's not difficult to beat the NRA security watch.

Col. Dr. Kiiza Besigye escaped while under heavy guard by the best of the NRA soldiers, the CMI, and Kony's LRA had always escaped at a time when the NRA claimed it had them cornered.

Indeed Ugandan military authorities had no way of getting wind of the impending invasion precisely, because Rwandan officers and men in the NRA who occupied strategic command positions in the CMI, Military Police and the PPU, ensured total secrecy that led to the massive departure of the Rwandan fighters without detection.

The claim that General Rwigyema flew by helicopter visiting units in Luwero and Masindi in preparation of the attack is false. Firstly the NRA did not have any sound and technically reliable military helicopters that could fly such rounds. Secondly, there were hardly any Rwandan soldiers in Luwero and Masindi garrisons.

They were mainly in operational areas of the North, such as Gulu and Kitgum. The claim that General Salim Saleh re-organised "the rebel force helping them dig some defences and advising" them to apply guerilla tactics is purely fiction.

Indeed the initial setbacks suffered by the RPA, were as a result of the fact that their doctrine and fighting formation and tactics were still NRA's in nature. It was not until the RPA quickly evolved its own character as a fighting force, a total departure from the NRA approach that the Rwandan guerilla force started scoring decisive victories against the enemy.

Any tactical changes during the course of the liberation war were conceived and designed by the RPA leadership. The only time Salim Saleh advised the RPF/A was when, in 1991, he dressed a Rwandan businessman, Silas Majyambere, in some sort of combat outfit and recommended him as the Vice Chairman of the RPF, an idea that was roundly rejected by the Front's leadership.

The only visit that Salim Saleh ever made to Rwanda during the liberation struggle was in 1993, in Mukarange where he exhibited emotions, surprised by the impressive formation, size and shape of the RPA fighters.

The cast of the so-called battle hardened NRA soldiers that General Saleh allegedly sent to re-enforce the RPA, again proves the bankruptcy of this narrative.

The officers documented in the Observer article were known habitual criminals within the NRA ranks, and there was no way Paul Kagame, a legendary disciplinarian would have allowed such rogue commanders to be part of the force that he led.

Quite frankly the relationship between these soldiers and Gen. Saleh was hardly military.

The only Ugandan volunteers who crossed to fight alongside the Rwandan fighters were Okwir Rwabwoni, then a corporal and a few others who had served as escorts to Rwandan officers.

It is true that President Museveni gave political support and allowed limited and controlled passage of Rwandan volunteers and material through his territory, but Uganda did not provide any equipment to the RPA.

When the RPF liberation war started in October 1990, Ugandan authorities moved quickly to close the common border with the intention, as they publicly declared, of "stemming the flow of the thousands of Rwandese volunteers" who were headed for the frontline.

Indeed at the height of the genocide President Museveni had troops stationed along the common border, but he never sent a single one of them to intervene to save lives.

Any serious military expert would discern that the viciousness of the RPF liberation war necessitated that Rwandans themselves had to fight it.

The nature of the war simply excluded any foreign participation.

The strategic leadership which shifted the entire RPA military doctrine from the NRA tactics and strategies has led to the new character that has shaped the Rwandan Defence Forces.

The evolution of the culture and doctrine unique to the RDF evidently played a critical role in subsequent wars in the Congo against FDRL/Interahamwe and their supporters and the removal of Mobutu and subsequent decisive victories against insurgent groups inside the country, as well as the remarkably successful peacekeeping missions around the world.

Nothing demonstrates the fact that the two armies are not from the same neck of the woods, as the decisive defeat of the UPDF under Gen. Kazini, by the RDF on three occasions in Kisangani.
The allegation by top Ugandan army officers that Gen. Fred Rwigyema was killed by RPA officers due to "internal tensions" should be treated with the contempt it deserves. Gen. Salim Saleh and his cohorts should know better.

Soldiers die in battles. And of all armies the Ugandan army officers should be the last to insinuate that Gen. Rwigyema as the overall commander of the RPA at that time could not have been killed by enemy fire.

During the period of five years the NRA spent in the bushes of Luwero, the force lost four overall commanders, who included Ahmed Seguya, Sam Magara, Rubereza and Hannington Mugabi. If their own experience is such that top commanders die, only due to "internal tensions", it does not necessarily apply to other guerilla movements and certainly not to the RPF.

When the RPF was pushed into the final option of taking up arms against the fascist regime in Kigali, it had carefully planned a protracted war that was going to take long. The Front had a clear ideology and well thought-out policies. Cadres, both political and military, had been mobilized to prepare for a long drawn-out war.

Nobody was in a hurry to capture Kigali. Indeed, contrary to the claims by the NRA officers, in 1993, RPA fighters voluntarily withdrew from captured positions in the outskirts of Kigali, and went back to the negotiating table in Arusha, against the pressure of these very NRA leaders.

This pressure was consistent with the NRA leadership's efforts to interfere with the conduct of the liberation war in Rwanda, by smuggling messages to certain RPA commanders.

As it turned out Museveni's commanders had been pursuing his wishes.

In 1997 as the RPA war against Zaïre's Mobutu approached the end, with the Rwandan troops having reached Kikwit in Bandundu Province, 300 kms from Kinshasa, President Museveni asked then Rwandan Vice President and Minister of Defence, Paul Kagame to halt the RPA troops and have them replaced by the UPDF, under the command of Gen. Salim Saleh, an offer that was turned down by Rwanda.

Obviously, the Ugandan President whose troops had not been part of the war against Mobutu, sought to trick Rwanda into allowing its troops to make the final triumphant march into Kinshasa, and claim the victory over Mobutu.

The alleged declaration by President Museveni that the invasion "backfired because Rwigyema had not listened to him" is a joke.

If Museveni had been the accomplished military strategist that NRA officers portray him to be, he would not have been routed by Idi Amin in Mbarara in 1972, where he ended up the only survivor of the invading force he was leading to attack the town.

Indeed any seasoned soldier would wonder how Mr. Museveni would, nine years later, launch an attack on Kabamba with his fighters packed in a sealed lorry, which was evidently a death trap! Clearly, if the NRA/UPDF had been experts in guerilla warfare, they would not still be running around in circles behind Kony and his Lord Resistance Army (LRA).

Therefore, they were no strategic, operational or tactical lessons any serious guerilla movement like RPA could borrow from the NRA and its commanders.

It is an irony that the article in the Observer should quote NRA officers who claim that "Gen.Tinyefuza used the excitement caused by the controversial ranches restructuring in Sembabule to conceal the recruitment and training of RPF fighters".

This is hogwash. Today, Gen. Tinyefuza is at the centre of a storm involving land wrangles in the same areas of Masaka and Sembabule, and the ongoing eviction of the Bararo in Burisa, Masindi, from their land; who is he preparing to recruit and train on the land he is grabbing?

As to the timing of honouring those who played a role in Rwanda's liberation struggle, every event and occasion has its own time.

Rwanda's own leaders who spearheaded the revolution were honoured only three years ago. Nothing is far from the truth than the claim that President Museveni would have been honoured earlier if it was not for "frosty relations" between the two countries.

Otherwise how would this argument explain Late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Prime Minister Zenawi being honoured on the same occasion? Indeed how does the NRA/UPDF leadership explain the fact that they honoured their most outstanding heroes, Brigadiers Matayo Kyaligonza and Pecos Kuteesa only last month, over twenty three years after they captured Kampala? Were they victims of "frosty relations" and "internal tensions" within the NRA/UPDF?

On July 4th, Rwanda exhibited gratitude at its best, by honouring those who played a role in the liberation of the country, a tradition that other African countries should emulate. However, make no mistake about it; the liberation struggle belongs to the people of Rwanda and there are no two ways about it.

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The honours: Rwanda decorates foreign dignitaries

Uganda-Rwanda: Museveni’s untold role in RPF war